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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
FIDELITY IX\rESTENT CO~I
P . A_XY, a Utah l~orporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
Case No.
7550

vs.
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a Political
Corporation of the State of Utah.
Defendant and Appellant.

Appellants' Brief
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This action was tried upon an agreed Statement of
Facts. (R-4) Plaintiff corporation is the owner of certain real property located within the limits of the defendant county. The property of the plaintiff was subject to taxation for the year 1949 and the general taxes
for that year were duly levied and assessed thereon and
notice thereof given the plaintiff. The plaintiff failed
to pay such taxes before delinquency and the defendant
county duly caused to be published the delinquent list of
properties upon which taxes for said year remain unpaid
and plaintiff's property was duly advertised in said
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delinquent list. On December 20, 1949, the plaintiff tendered to the County Treasurer the full amount of the
taxes upon said property together with the penalty thereon, but the Treasurer of the defendant county rejected
said tender and demanded that the plaintiff make payment of the sum of 25c advertising fee in addition to the
tendered amount. During the year 1939 and at all times
thereafter to the present time the County Treasurer of
the defendant county has construed the statutes to require him to charge and he has charged the advertising
fee of 25c in addition to the tax and penalty "Thether
or not the tax was paid before sale.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
1. That the right to collect the 25c fee for publishing notice on the delinquent list is properly charged by
the defendant county by reason of the fee scheduled in
Section 28-2-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1943.
2. That a construction of all the applicable statutes
permitting such a charge should be adopted as following
the continued administrative construction of the same.
ARGUMENT
Point 1
The following statutes would appear to be in conflict as to the right to charge au advertising fee after delinquency and before sale. Section 28-2-5 Utah Code
Annotated 1943, reads in part as follows : ''The County
Treasurer shall receive the following fees: . . . For
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each item published in the delinquent list under the proYision of Section 80-10-28, 25 rents.'' The defendant
county is required by la\v to so publish the delinquent list
and thus to incur an obligation to pay for such publication. This publication is made prior to the date of sale.
After that each delinquent property is an ''item published.'' The reasonable construction of the aforesaid statute "Tould seem to be that the reimbursements to the
defendant county for the cost of such publication should
be made by charging it against the property at the rate
of 23c for each item pursuant to the provision of the
above quoted statute. It would seem, therefore, that the
time when the 25c fee is payable is \vhen the defendant
county has necessarily incurred the expense of such publication, and that the fee should ·be collected for each item
after the publication expense has been incurred, even
though the tax and the penalty are paid or tendered
before the sale date.
Apparently contrary IS that portion of Section
80-10-28 which reads in part a.s follows: ''The County
Treasurer must publish with such list a notice that unless
the delinquent taxes together with the penalty are paid
before the lOth day of January . . . the real property
upon which such taxes .are a lien . . . will be sold for
taxes, penalty and costs on said date.'' (Emphasis added)
It has been stated that the general rule of law requires taxing statutes to be construed favorably to the
taxpayer, but it is also stated as a general rule that "tax
statutes are to receive a reasonable construction with a
vie\v of carrying out their purpose and intent" 51 A. J.
3
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361 Section 309. As was said in Hart vs. Smith, 159 Ind.
182, 64 Northeast 661, 58 L.R.A. 949, 95 Am. St. Rep. 280.
''Taxes are burdens that must necessarily be laid and the
government is not to be regarded as a public enemy in
imposing them. Such la\vs should not be construed from
the standpoint of the taxpayer alone.'' The reasonable
construction of the aforementioned statutes would not
allow the taxpayer who has allowed his taxes to go delinquent to escape the advertising fee and against his property at any time after the advertising expense has
necessarily been incurred. The advertising has a dual
purpose. The first of this is to inform the taxpayer and
all interested persons that the property is about to be sold
so as to give the taxpayer or his successors an opportunity to pay the tax before sale or during the period of redemption. The second purpose is or might be to inform
the general public of the properties which have been sold
in order that there may be bidders at the May sale after
the period of redemption.
The first and paramount reason for the publication
is for the protection of the taxpayer himself. Hence, it
would not seem unreasonable to require the taxpayer to
bear the cost of such publication and protection after his
default.
Point 2
The construction of the statute contended for by the
appellant has been the administrative interpretation of
the statutes in question during and at all times since
1939. The rule has been stated in McCaughn v. Hershey
Chocolate Company, 283, U. S. 488, 75 L. Ed. 1183, 51

4
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

S. Ct. 510, as follows : ''The provision has been consistently enforced as construed, 'vas re-enacted by Congress
in the 1921 Art, and remained on the statute books without amendment until its repeal. Such a construction of a
doubtful or ambiguous statute by officials charged with
its administration will not be judicially disturbed except
for reason of weight, which this record does not present.
(citing cases) ''The re-enactment of the statute by
Congress, as well as the failure to amend it in the face
of the consistent administrative construction, is at least
persuasive of a legislative recognition and approval of
the statute as construed." (citing cases)
CONCLUSION
Appellant, therefore, believes that the decree of the
trial court should be reversed and the cause remitted
with directions, judgment to be entered declaring that
the County herein had authority to collect the 25c advertising fee.
Respectfully submitted,
EDWARD M. MORRISSEY,
County Attorney
ARTHUR A. ALLEN, JR.,
Chief Deputy County Attorney
WILLIAM S. LIVINGSTON,
Deputy County Attorney
Attorneys for the Defendants
a;nd the Appellants
RECEIVED two copies of the foregoing brief this
···············----------------··--- day of June, 1950.

Attorney for the Plaintiff atn.d Respondent.
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